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Abstract 
During healthy economic/financial times, credit growth often happens without proper provisioning. This is due 
to a managerial myopia that underestimates the risks underlying an expansive lending policy, leading to lower 
profitability in following years. However, given the countercyclicality of credit standards, this effect shouldn’t 
occur during harsh times. In this paper, we analyse the relationship between abnormal credit growth and bank 
profitability during a crisis period. In particular, we test the hypothesis that during a crisis, abnormal credit 
growth improves bank profitability, given the need for higher, or at least stable, credit standards. We find support 
for this assumption using a sample of 101 large European banks observed during the recent crisis period. Results 
are robust to different robustness checks. 
Keywords: financial crisis, bank profitability, loan growth, loan loss provisions 
1. Introduction 
The recent crisis has once more proved that irrational exuberance can lead to financial catastrophe. The abnormal 
credit growth (i.e. the positive difference between loan growth experienced by several aggressive banks, and 
corresponding overall market figures) observed before the collapse of Lehman Brothers can be described as a 
typical example supporting Minsky’s financial instability framework (Minsky 1992). On observing their 
neighbours catching “big prey”, financial units were switching to aggressive behaviour – from hedging units to 
speculative units, and from speculative units to Ponzi units, in Minsky’s terms; but then came a period of famine, 
and the financial system collapsed. Overestimation of the persistence of asset growth and underestimation of the 
risks linked to fast credit expansion underlay the creation and enlargement of the bubble: the growing spread 
between risk appetite and risk consciousness led to financial meltdown. 
In the literature it has been observed that during healthy times, abnormal credit expansion typically leads to 
higher loan loss provisions in the following years (Foos, Norden and Weber, 2010); this produces adverse effects 
on bank profitability (Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, & Stulz, 2018). The reasons for the negative outcome are due to 
managerial myopia, which reflects short-termism, adverse incentives and underestimation of risks. However, 
managers can learn from experience, and their behaviour is likely to be different during famine: in harsh times, 
only those who are skilled and well-equipped will take the risk of hunting big prey. Under these assumptions, 
during a severe period of financial distress, abnormal credit growth should be seen as a signal of health and not a 
pathological strategy undertaken by a bank. Bankers expanding credit above the average (or reducing it less than 
the average) during a crisis period should be conscious of the risks involved in their choices and have a strong 
incentive to act prudently, while also provisioning for credit losses. This different approach during market booms 
and crashes is consistent with the countercyclical shape of credit standards introduced by Ruckes (2004): the 
final outcome of this process is that abnormal credit growth during a crisis should have a beneficial effect on 
bank profitability over time. 
The aim of this paper is to test the relationship between abnormal credit growth and bank profitability during a 
crisis period. In particular, we test the hypothesis that during a crisis period, abnormal credit growth improves 
bank profitability, given the need for higher, or at least stable, credit standards. To do this, we use a wide set of 
bank-level data for a sample of 101 European banks during the period 2006-2014. In particular, we examine the 
effect of abnormal credit growth on bank profitability, controlling for lending quality through the use of 
coincident and lagged loan loss provisions. Abnormal credit growth, being built as a “more-than-average” 
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measure of variation, has a straightforward interpretation and allows us to explore the phenomenon without 
introducing arbitrary thresholds into our econometric analysis. Moreover, it can be used both in healthy 
(indicating fast credit growth) and in distressed periods (measuring smaller contractions in the supplying of 
credit by the banking system). Positive figures of abnormal loan growth indicate an expansion in banks’ credit 
market share, independently of the economic cycle conditions. 
The existing literature (above all, Foos, Norden & Weber, 2010; Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier & Stulz, 2018) focuses 
on the role of abnormal lending expansion during good times in explaining higher loan loss provisions (and 
lower profitability levels) in the following years; in this sense, fast credit growth can be seen as an explanatory 
variable of crisis periods at micro and macro level. On the contrary, our work makes its contribution to the 
literature by analysing the effects of fast credit growth on bank profitability during a crisis. Empirical findings 
confirm the hypothesis under investigation and provide several policy implications for bankers and regulators. 
Of these, we demonstrate that during crisis periods the traditional “curse of the winner” linked to credit 
expansion is not likely to be observed. In this sense, aggressive strategies – when coupled with adequate 
provisioning and credit standards – can improve bank profitability: hence, attention should be switched from the 
raw pace of credit growth to the risk attitude of the banking system. This is true both from a managerial and from 
a macro-prudential point of view.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief literature review; Section 3 
describes the hypothesis and the econometric model used to test it; Section 4 includes empirical estimations. In 
Section 5, we draw conclusions and policy implications. 
2. Literature Review 
Since the seminal works by Short (1979) and Bourke (1989), academic research has investigated the sources of 
bank profitability widely. Competitive dynamics, continuously changing regulation, and the introduction of new 
accounting standards contributed in subsequent years to rendering research activity challenging. However, the 
different streams in the literature converge in identifying two main sets of factors that affect bank profitability 
(Athanasoglou, Brissimis & Delis, 2008): firm-specific features and macroeconomic environment (including 
competitive conditions). 
The recent crisis period provided evidence for the close relationship between micro and macroeconomic factors 
in determining bank profitability and overall system stability. In particular, the crisis proved that a wide number 
of microeconomic imbalances can result in a severe macroeconomic downturn. The (individual) fast credit 
growth undertaken by some banks was the trigger for the following crisis period; more relaxed credit standards 
generated huge amounts of loan losses in the following years, giving birth to one of the most severe recessions 
ever seen in modern times. 
A recent stream of literature has studied the link between loan growth and credit quality. The underlying 
assumption is that fast credit growth is associated with a relaxation of lending standards, leading to a soaring 
level of loan loss provisions (LLP) in the following years. Studying more than 16,000 banks during the period 
1997-2007, Foos, Norden and Weber (2010) found that an abnormal credit growth generates greater LLP. This 
relationship traditionally occurs with a lag of some years. A recent paper by Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier and Stulz 
(2018) generalizes this analysis to describe the link between loan growth and bank profitability; findings indicate 
that fast credit growth is usually coupled with low simultaneous loan loss provisioning, leading to high 
profitability in the (coincident) year of fast growth, but weaker performance in the following period. This 
myopic approach by the banking system can be explained as an underestimation of the risks related to rapid 
expansion in lending. The expected (short term) growth in interest income hides a (medium term) deterioration 
effect in credit quality, but the managers pay more attention to immediate positive results. 
This behaviour is less likely to occur during a crisis period: in harsh times, the pressure on bank profitability 
pushes managers to adopt quality strategies and a wiser lending policy (Ruckes, 2004). In this context, fast credit 
growth should better indicate a bank’s sound financial position, allowing an expansive strategy to improve its 
market share. In other words, the crisis tends to reduce moral hazard in credit management. The outcome of fast 
credit growth, under these assumptions, should be an increase in bank profitability. 
Besides management of loans, other bank-specific features affect profitability; in particular, efficiency and 
leverage are usually mentioned in empirical works in the literature. The most important measure of efficiency (or, 
in this case, inefficiency) is the ‘cost-to-income’ ratio: wide empirical evidence supports a negative relationship 
between this indicator and bank profits. As regards leverage, several authors (among others, Bourke 1989; 
Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999; Goddard, Molyneux & Wilson, 2004a; Pasiouras & Kosmidou, 2007) have 
found a significant relation between ‘equity-to-total-asset’ ratio and bank performance. However, results may 
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change using different profitability measures. Indeed, on the one hand, lower leverage reduces the riskiness of 
the bank’s financial structure, lowering the risk premium required by the bondholders and stockholders; on the 
other hand, a higher level of capitalization may improve ROAA (return on average assets), but reduces ROAE 
(return on average equity), equity being the denominator of this latter ratio (Dietrich & Wanzenried 2014).  
In the literature the importance of market characteristics from a macroeconomic and competitive point of view is 
also recognized. There is wide consensus on the expected positive relation between economic growth and bank 
profits. However, for the recent crisis period Saeed (2014) found a negative impact of GDP growth on ROA and 
ROE for 73 UK commercial banks.  
Market concentration and competition have been identified in the literature as important factors in the generation 
of bank profits. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), using a wide cross-country panel for the years 1988-1995, 
found that a higher ‘bank-assets-to-GDP’ ratio and lower market concentration lead to lower bank profits. 
Beckmann (2007), analysing 16 Western European countries for the period 1979-2003, showed that capital 
market orientation has a relevant impact on bank profitability, while industry concentration does not play a 
crucial role in profit making. Economic growth can also affect bank competition, reducing the persistence of 
bank profits (Goddard et al. 2011). An interesting insight regarding the role of market concentration in 
determining bank profitability was developed by Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014): results for a large sample of 
10,165 commercial banks across 118 countries for the period 1998-2012 show a positive effect of concentration 
on ROAE and ROAA in low-income countries, but it is negative in high-income countries. These latter results 
suggest that the development of the financial system lowers the oligopolistic rents associated with more 
concentrated markets by the traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance theoretical framework. 
Finally, inflation can play a role in influencing banks’ profitability, since it affects interest rates and asset values; 
however, mixed effects are reported in the literature exploring this causal nexus (Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga 
2000; Pasiouras & Kosmidu 2007; Beltratti & Stulz 2012; Trujillo-Ponce 2013). 
3. Hypothesis and Model 
To test the hypothesis of a positive relationship between abnormal loan growth and bank profitability during the 
crisis, we employ two sets of explanatory variables: firm-specific information and macroeconomic data, 
including competitive condition figures, for a sample of 101 European banks during the period 2006-2014. Our 
dataset covers the eleven ‘first entrant’ countries of the Euro-area (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain). However, two of them (Ireland and the 
Netherlands) are not included in the final sample, given widespread missing values in domestic bank balance 
sheets. The time span under investigation is set to fully capture the effect of the recent financial crisis on bank 
profitability; since 2015, macroeconomic conditions have started to improve in several European countries. 
Our dataset includes bank-level data derived from individual bank balance sheets and income statements, as 
available from the BvD Bankscope database. We consider only commercial, cooperative and saving banks that 
showed total assets higher than 10 billion Euros in 2014 and with a complete set of information over time. Given 
the widespread presence of small credit institutions in the countries included in the dataset (e.g. the Italian 
banche di credito cooperativo or the German raiffeisenbanken), we use this threshold to obtain a more 
homogeneous sample and avoid problems of over-representation of these banks in our econometric estimation. 
Moreover, during the crisis, the extreme macroeconomic conditions impacted on small banks’ financial reports, 
producing a huge variance in several balance sheet items. In order to eliminate error in sample selection, we 
crosschecked the Bankscope classification and borderline values with banks’ annual reports. Banks involved in 
M&A activity during the period under observation – which naturally show high levels of loan growth – are 
excluded from the final sample. For macroeconomic and competitive conditions we use data from the European 
Central Bank and Eurostat.  
We consider two dependent variables to explain bank profitability: ROAA and ROAE. ROAA explains bank 
capacity to generate profits from the managed assets, and is considered the key ratio for evaluating bank 
profitability (Golin 2013); ROAE reveals how much profit a company generates with the shareholders’ capital.  
In accordance with the empirical literature on the determinants of bank profitability presented in the previous 
section, we consider different bank-specific characteristics as explanatory variables. Since the aim of this paper 
is to explore the relationship between abnormal loan growth (ALG) and bank profitability, the former variable is 
the most crucial for our econometric estimations. Abnormal loan growth indicates the difference between the 
annual growth rate of the gross loans of a bank and the corresponding growth rate of aggregate loan amount 
(source OECD) in the country where the bank is located (Foos, Norden & Weber, 2010). During the crisis, some 
banks have been forced to reduced – sometimes by a large share – their loans; this has not been usually a 
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strategic choice, but an outcome of their financial imbalances superimposed by the regulators. Hence, in order to 
manage this potential source of bias, we changed the computation of ALG as originally proposed by Foos, 
Norden and Weber (2010). More specifically, our variable indicates the non-negative difference between the 
annual growth rate of the gross loans of a bank and the corresponding growth rate of aggregate loan amount as 
registered in OECD statistics. Hence, we set to zero observations linked to banks that experienced loans 
variations lower than the market: in a certain sense, we focus only on “real” growth. Note that by construction 
the variable assumes a positive sign when a bank-specific percentage change in loans is greater than the market 
average percentage: this is true both when a bank is increasing loans more than the market and when the bank is 
reducing credit to customers less than its competitors. Being a way to expand business opportunities, abnormal 
loan growth may promote bank profitability: this naturally occurs when growth is not coupled with lower quality 
standards. This latter factor is an element of concern widely recognised in the existing literature and usually 
indicated as the main reason for the negative relationship between ALG and bank profitability (Fahlenbrach, 
Prilmeier & Stulz, 2018). Since loans typically produce effects on banks’ income statements over time, and 
adverse effects are usually observed with a lag of some years (Foos, Norden & Weber, 2010), we introduce both 
coincident and lagged versions of this variable. As explained above, we expect a positive sign for the coefficient 
associated with abnormal loan growth during the time span under examination. 
The hypothesis we want to test states that during a crisis, credit growth occurs without relaxing credit standards. 
We cannot directly observe this latter item, but we can extract a proxy from income statements, using loan loss 
provision (LLP) figures. Loan loss provisions to average gross loans are part of the overall cost of lending 
activity. In this sense they have a negative impact on bank profitability (Chronopoulos et al., 2015) as measured 
by ROAA and ROAE. In our econometric estimation we use LLP to check the credit risk assessment process 
indirectly. If a bank is measuring the risk of its credit portfolio wisely, its provisioning should be properly set in 
order to prevent future losses; in an econometric test this implies a negative sign of the coefficient associated 
with coincident LLP, while lagged versions of the variable should be associated with non-significant coefficients. 
We include Total assets in our set of explanatory variables to account for bank size. An increase in bank size has 
two opposite effects: on the one hand, the opportunity to exploit scale and scope economies (Pasiouras & 
Kosmidou, 2007) and, on the other hand, the costs associated with bureaucracy and complexity (Stiroh & 
Rumble, 2006). Hence, the expected sign is undetermined. 
The ratio of Equity to Total Assets is introduced as a measure of capital strength. High ratios indicate a low level 
of leverage, and therefore low riskiness; consequently, on the basis of the conventional risk-return hypothesis, 
they are associated with lower expected profitability. However, as noted by Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014), 
lower levels of risk strengthen a bank’s soundness and reduce funding costs, with a positive effect on its 
profitability. Given these opposite effects, the impact of a bank’s capitalization on profitability is not 
theoretically determined. 
Since we explore loans dynamics, we use the Net Loans to Total Assets ratio to measures the weight of loans (net 
of reserves) on total assets. It shows a bank’s traditional approach towards lending activities and, indirectly, its 
experience/specialization in granting credit, leading to a deeper awareness of credit risk evaluation. In this sense, 
we expect this variable to have a positive effect on profitability (in line with Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga 2000; 
Abreu-Mendes, 2001; Goddard et al., 2013). 
Finally, we employ Cost income figures to account for bank efficiency. Calculated as the ratio between operating 
costs (which include administrative costs, staff expenses and property costs) and gross revenues, this indicator is 
particularly important during troubled periods, when traditional margins are put under pressure; naturally, a 
lower level of this ratio is expected to have a positive effect on bank profitability (see, among others, Molyneux 
& Thorton, 1992; Goddard et al., 2013; Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2014). 
Turning to the macroeconomic dimension, our set of external indicators includes different country-specific 
variables that are likely to influence bank profitability. Undoubtedly, the soundness of the surrounding economic 
environment, the strength of competition in the banking sector and other external factors impact on the costs and 
revenues of a bank, on the quality of its assets and hence on its financial stability. 
To capture fluctuations in the economic cycle we use real GDP growth for each country under investigation. 
Previous studies have found a positive relationship between this variable and the profitability of the banking 
sector (Athanasoglou, Delis & Staikouras, 2006; Beckmann, 2007; Albertazzi & Gambacorta, 2009; Goddard et 
al., 2011; Kanas, Vasiliou & Eriotis, 2012). Improved market conditions are associated with better quality loan 
portfolios and increased net interest margins. Growth in credit demand raises interest rates, while an abundance 
of liquidity on the market reduces funding costs for banks. Naturally, the worsening of economic conditions 
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leads to an opposite result, compressing banks’ profit margins. 
Looking at the geographical area covered, the choice to select countries that are part of the Euro Area allows us 
to have a homogeneous environment with regard to monetary policy. Nevertheless, there are still differences in 
levels of inflation and interest rates. To deal with this source of heterogeneity we use the national HICP 
(Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices) index for each country, as inflation influences different items in the 
bank balance sheets, such as asset value, funding costs and interest rates on loans. However, in the existing 
literature there is no clear evidence concerning the final effect of inflation on bank profitability (Demirguc-Kunt 
& Huizinga, 2000; Pasiouras & Kosmidu, 2007; Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; Trujillo-Ponce, 2013); the expected sign 
of the coefficient in our regressions is therefore uncertain. 
Considering in more detail the competitive dimension of the banking system, the traditional theories concerning 
the effect of competition on firm profitability have been applied to the banking sector, leading to different 
approaches. These include the Structure-Conduct-Performance hypothesis, the Efficient-Structure hypothesis, the 
Expense Preference hypothesis, and the Galbraith-Caves Risk-avoidance hypothesis (for a review of the 
literature on these topics see Rasiah 2010). Usually, a higher degree of market concentration is associated with 
the opportunity to extract oligopolistic rents through collusive behaviour. However, a concentrated banking 
market can be the result of fierce competition between intermediaries: this could lead to compression of their 
profit margins, for example in the traditional activity of borrowing and lending, thus reducing bank profitability. 
As a result, the expected effect of concentration on profitability is uncertain. It is also worth observing that is 
difficult to find an uncontroversial measure of market concentration; previous studies have used a wide set of 
indicators (e.g. the market share of the first 3-5 players, the Lerner Index, etc.). We use the Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index (HHI) of total assets for each country, as it is the measure of market concentration commonly 
used by the European Central Bank. 
In order to explore the link between abnormal credit growth and bank profitability, we run the following 
dynamic panel model (dynamic specification is in line with the results of Goddard et al. 2011): 
Π௜௧ = αΠ௜௧ିଵ + βଵALG௜௧ + βଶALG௜௧ିଵ + βଷALG௜௧ିଶ + βସLLP௜௧ + βହLLP௜௧ିଵ + β଺LLP௜௧ିଶ + ෍ 𝛽௝𝑋௜௧௝
௃
௝ୀଵ
+ ෍ 𝛽௠𝑋௜௧௠ +  𝛽ௗ𝐷௧
ெ
௠ୀଵ
+ 𝜀௜௧ 
where Πit is the profitability of bank i at time t and εit the disturbance term. Our explanatory variables are 
grouped into bank-specific (𝑋௜௧௝ ) and macroeconomic (𝑋௜௧௠); moreover, a dummy (𝐷௧) captures the effects of 
the sovereign debt crisis (years 2011-2014). We include coincident and lagged ALG and LLP (up to 2 lags) in 
order to control for the effect of credit growth and credit quality on profitability over time. Table 1 lists and 
describes the variables used in this study and indicates their expected effects on bank profitability.  
 
Table 1. Definition of variables and their expected effects 
Type Variable Description Expected effect 
Dependent variable ROAA Return on average assets  ROAE Return on average equity  
Bank-specific variables 
Abnormal Loan growth Positive difference between bank’s loan growth and country loan growth + 
Loan Loss Provisions Loan loss provisions to average gross loans - 
Total assets Natural Logarithm of total assets +/- 
Equity_assets Equity over  total assets +/- 
Loans_assets Net Loans over total assets + 
Cost Income Cost income ratio - 
Macroeconomic and 
competitive variables 
GDP growth rate Annual real GDP growth + 
HICP Harmonized index of consumer prices – Euro Area +/- 
HHI Herfindahl Hirschman index for credit institutions’ Total Assets +/- 
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4. Data and Econometric Estimations 
Overall, the sample includes 101 banks for a 7-year period (although years 2006 and 2007 are used only to 
calculate the lagged values of ALG, LLP and dependent variables). The panel composition is shown in Table 2. 
The three most important countries for the Euro area banking system (France, Germany and Italy) dominate the 
sample. Data availability and our research strategy, which filters out small institutions in order to compare banks 
of similar size, led to a relative over-representation of France in our panel. However, this result is consistent with 
the specific features of the French cooperative banking system, which is characterized by players which are 
bigger than Italian and German mutual banks. 
Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the econometric estimation. Maximum and 
minimum values reported in Table 3 evidence the presence of sporadic borderline observations. This is not 
surprising, given the specific features of the recent crisis period. The dramatic deterioration of the general 
economic environment threatened the financial stability of several banks in the countries included in our sample: 
extreme (negative) values for profitability were observed and some intermediaries lost a large part of their 
capitalization. This led to raising of capital and government bailouts in several countries. 
With regard to our dataset, given that extreme figures refer to different banks in different years and countries, 
they do not seem to identify specific outliers. In any case, in order to remove their potential influence on our 
empirical results, we winsorized (1% for each tail) all the variables affected by an abnormally high range of 
minimum and maximum values. These include ROAA, ROAE, ALG, LLP, equity-assets ratio and cost income 
ratio. Empirical results  are consistent both using the original raw data and excluding observations outside the 
1st-99th percentile range (results are available on request). 
 
Table 2. Sample composition 
Country N° of observations N° of banks 
Austria 28 4 
Belgium 21 3 
Germany 147 21 
Spain 35 5 
Finland 21 3 
France 322 46 
Italy 112 16 
Luxemburg 7 1 
Portugal 14 2 
Total 707 101 
  
of  which 
Commercial 280 40 
Saving 168 24 
Cooperative 259 37 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Notation No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Return on Average Assets ROAA 707 0.310 0.605 -5.882 2.333 
Return on Average Assets ROAE 707 3.999 11.638 -119.859 46.751 
Abnormal Loan growth ALG 707 4.708 8.605 0.000 88.460 
Loan loss provisions LLP 707 0.535 0.733 -6.080 5.210 
Total assets Total assets 707 17.210 1.325 14.124 21.533 
Equity over total assets Equity_assets 707 7.265 2.954 0.932 15.852 
Net Loans over total assets Loans_assets 707 59.987 19.451 8.776 93.155 
Cost Income ratio Cost Income 707 63.221 15.985 24.184 148.458 
Annual real GDP growth  GDP growth rate 707 0.092 2.273 -8.300 5.700 
HICP index – Euro Area HICP 707 1.722 1.098 -0.900 4.500 
Herfindahl Hirschman index for Total Assets HHI 707 0.060 0.052 0.019 0.370 
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Given that dynamic specification introduces problems of consistency, in order to estimate the dynamic panel 
model properly we rely on instrumental variable techniques such as GMM estimators (Arellano and Bond 1991; 
Blundell and Bond 1998). In particular, we use the GMM-DIF estimator, as under the assumption of no serial 
correlation of the error term in levels, it is possible to use values in level of the dependent variable and 
endogenous regressors lagged two or more periods back as instruments (Note 1). Estimation results are presented 
in Tables 4 and 5; GMM-DIF model results are compared with a fixed-effect specification. Moreover, since the 
autoregressive process is weak for our dependent variables, we include the results of a fixed-effect static 
specification. 
 
Table 4. Estimation results for return on average assets 
Dep. var.: ROAA (1) FE_stat (2) FE_dyn (3) GMM 
Explanatory var. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. 
ROAA i, t-1  0.05 0.069 0.03 0.042 
ALG i, t 0.01*** 0.002 0.01*** 0.002 0.01*** 0.003 
ALG i, t-1 0.01*** 0.002 0.01*** 0.002 0.01*** 0.002 
ALG i, t-2 0.00 0.003 0.00 0.003 0.00 0.002 
LLP i, t -0.30*** 0.048 -0.30*** 0.049 -0.34*** 0.042 
LLP i, t-1 -0.01 0.036 0.01 0.037 -0.01 0.034 
LLP i, t-2 -0.01 0.031 -0.01 0.031 -0.05* 0.029 
Total Assets -0.16 0.202 -0.16 0.194 -0.47*** 0.176 
Equity_assets 0.05*** 0.017 0.05*** 0.016 0.02 0.019 
Loans_assets -0.00 0.004 -0.00 0.004 -0.01*** 0.005 
Cost Income ratio -0.02*** 0.002 -0.02*** 0.002 -0.02*** 0.002 
GDP growth rate 0.01 0.007 0.01 0.007 0.01** 0.006 
HICP 0.04*** 0.013 0.04*** 0.014 0.03** 0.012 
HHI -3.12** 1.532 -2.80* 1.576 -3.98*** 1.513 
D_sovereign_crisis -0.14*** 0.026 -0.13*** 0.030 -0.11*** 0.028 
Constant 4.39 3.741 4.23 3.583   
No. of observations 707  707  606  
No. of banks 101  101  101  
R-squared 0.51  0.51    
AR(1)     0.000  
AR(2)     0.390  
Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
Table 5. Estimation results for return on average equity 
Dep. var.: ROAE (1) FE_stat (2) FE_dyn (3) GMM 
Explanatory var. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. 
ROAE i, t-1   0.16*** 0.055 0.15*** 0.041 
ALG i, t 0.11** 0.048 0.10** 0.044 0.10* 0.054 
ALG i, t-1 0.15*** 0.036 0.14*** 0.032 0.13*** 0.033 
ALG i, t-2 0.07* 0.037 0.06* 0.036 0.05* 0.031 
LLP i, t -5.51*** 0.922 -5.29*** 0.959 -6.05*** 0.746 
LLP i, t-1 -0.04 0.774 0.59 0.712 0.09 0.624 
LLP i, t-2 0.21 0.690 0.25 0.700 -0.58 0.530 
Total Assets -1.47 5.052 -1.80 4.283 -6.52** 3.246 
Equity_assets 0.54 0.407 0.52 0.329 0.08 0.354 
Loans_assets -0.06 0.086 -0.05 0.074 -0.25*** 0.094 
Cost Income ratio -0.37*** 0.043 -0.36*** 0.042 -0.36*** 0.029 
GDP growth rate 0.07 0.125 0.06 0.131 0.14 0.108 
HICP 0.67*** 0.252 0.45* 0.242 0.25 0.218 
HHI -39.84 34.852 -24.75 29.154 -32.59 26.881 
D_sovereign_crisis -2.08*** 0.558 -1.62*** 0.431 -1.28*** 0.492 
Constant 56.37 91.025 59.23 77.185   
No. of observations 707  707  606  
No. of banks 101  101  101  
R-squared 0.48  0.50    
AR(1)     0.000  
AR(2)     0.866  
Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Given the (expected) high correlation between ROAA and ROAE (equal to 0.87 over the whole sample), the 
regressions show similar results. Abnormal loan growth has a positive sign over all our regressions; this confirms 
our hypothesis of a direct link between ALG and profitability during a crisis period. The tendency to increase 
credit is usually considered an indicator of good health for a bank, and one of the most crucial drivers for 
boosting profitability; this is particularly true for banks belonging to the traditional “commercial banking” 
paradigm, where borrowing and lending money is the core business of each player. Results indicate positive 
coefficients both in coincident and lagged versions of ALG: this mean that the positive effects of lending growth 
on bank profits are felt across the following years and are not merely a temporary accounting outcome.  
As expected, coincident loan loss provisions are associated with negative and significant coefficients. This is not 
surprising, since LLP is a traditional source of costs in bank income statements. However, consistently with our 
research hypothesis, lagged LLPs do not show statistically significant coefficients; this result suggests that wise 
provisioning protects bank profitability in the following years. Econometric outcomes illustrate how loan growth 
occurs within a prudent framework, where provisions are adequate and there is not a roll-over of credit risks 
across years: this fits the assumptions of our test. A specific test on the relationship between loan loss provisions 
and abnormal loan growth is performed in section 4.1. 
With regard to the other explanatory variables, total assets and net loans to total assets are associated with 
negative (when significant) coefficients: this result can be explained by the pressure experienced during the crisis 
by several big banks which were more exposed to the lending sector. However, specialization in lending can 
exert a twofold effect on bank profitability for the members of our dataset. On the one hand profitability may be 
improved through better knowledge of the credit sector; on the other greater exposure through granting money to 
customers is an element of strong concern during a severe credit crisis like the recent one. Results from 
econometric estimations suggest that of the two elements, the latter dominated. 
We find significant coefficients on equity to total assets in fixed-effect ROAA regressions: greater levels of 
regulatory capital seem to have played a role in promoting profitability. 
The Cost Income ratio, as expected, has a steadily negative and significant sign. Banks’ efforts to improve their 
efficiency led to a higher level of profitability during the whole period under investigation. The high statistical 
significance of all the coefficients across different econometric estimations suggests the relevance of cost income 
in explaining bank profitability during a crisis period, when traditional revenue margins tend to decrease; hence, 
it is not surprising that during recent years regulators have continuously suggested that the banking system 
reduce its level of operating costs. 
With regard to macroeconomic conditions, we find positive coefficients for GDP growth and HICP in ROAA 
regressions. Considering the issue of concentration, HHI shows a negative and significant coefficient in the 
regressions. Estimation results appear consistent with a market framework in which concentration leads to 
tougher competition between banks, reducing profitability. This is likely to be true particularly in troubled 
periods, when rivalries are fiercer. 
4.1 Robustness Checks 
4.1.1 Abnormal Loan Growth and Loan Loss Provisions 
Since our research hypothesis states that during troubled periods fast loan growth occurs without generating 
higher loan loss provisions in the following years, we test this assumption directly following the empirical set-up 
implemented by Foos, Noorden and Weber (2010). In particular we estimate: 
LogLLP௜௧ = αΠLogLLP௜௧ିଵ + βଵALG௜௧ + βଶALG௜௧ିଵ + βଷALG௜௧ିଶ + ෍ 𝛽௝𝑋௜௧௝
௃
௝ୀଵ
+ 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 − 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+  𝛽ௗ𝐷௧𝜀 +௜௧ 
where LogLLP is the natural logarithm of loan loss provisions in year t over total loans in year t-1 and the other 
variables (abnormal loan growth, equity_assets and loans_assets) assume meanings as previously described. In 
line with the cited reference, we use a set of interacted country-year dummies in order to control for 
macroeconomic conditions; moreover size is calculated using the natural logarithm of total loans. Results are 
unaffected by different macroeconomic and size specifications. 
Table 6 shows the results. We observe that no statistically significant coefficient is found regarding ALG (either 
in the coincident or in the lagged version). We find negative coefficients for the level of capitalization and 
positive coefficients for the variable that accounts for business specialization: this is not surprising given the 
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specific features of the recent crisis. 
 
Table 6. Estimation results for LogLLP 
Dep. Var.: LogLLP Whole sample Reduced period 
 1 FE_dyn 2 GMM 3 FE_dyn  4 GMM
Explanatory var. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err.  Coeff. St.Err.
          
LogLLP i, t-1 0.05 0.064 0.01 0.186 0.03 0.102  0.09 0.137
ALG i, t 0.00 0.004 0.01 0.022 0.00 0.007  0.02 0.015
ALG i, t-1 0.00 0.003 0.00 0.010 0.00 0.006  -0.01 0.009
ALG i, t-2 0.00 0.003 0.00 0.008 -0.00 0.003  0.00 0.006
Size (ln loans) -0.39 0.276 -0.36 1.202 -0.48 0.392  -0.78 0.869
Equity_assets -0.14*** 0.028 -0.03 0.148 -0.15*** 0.038  -0.04 0.101
Loans_assets 0.02*** 0.005 0.01 0.031 0.01 0.008  0.00 0.021
D_sovereign_crisis -0.12 0.232 0.57 6.022 0.85 0.519  -0.79 0.908
Constant 7.53 5.831   9.85 8.265    
          
Interacted country-year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  
          
No of observations 627  519  440   429  
No of Banks 101  99  100   99  
R-squared 0.42    0.34     
AR(1)   0.220     0.073  
AR(2)   0.871     0.907  
Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. LogLLP is the natural logarithm of  the ratio between loan loss provisions in year 
t and existing loans in year t-1. 
 
4.1.2 Alternative Sample Selection Strategies and Time-Span Specifications 
To check the robustness of the baseline estimations previously described, we use different sample selection 
strategies and time-span specifications. First of all (see Tables 7 and 8), our model focuses on the crisis period; 
however, we use data from the pre-crisis period in lagged variables, at least for years 2008 and 2009. Then we 
run the model using only data for the period 2010-2014 (in this specification, lagged variables are also measured 
during the crisis). Our main results are unaffected by this test. 
 
Table 7. Reduced period (2008-2014): regression results for Return on average assets 
Dep. var.: ROAA (1) FE_stat (2) FE_dyn (3) GMM 
Explanatory var. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. 
ROAA i, t-1   -0.07 0.077 -0.04 0.043 
ALG i, t 0.00 0.003 0.00 0.003 0.01* 0.003 
ALG i, t-1 0.01*** 0.002 0.01*** 0.002 0.01*** 0.002 
ALG i, t-2 0.01*** 0.002 0.01*** 0.002 0.00** 0.002 
LLP i, t -0.33*** 0.052 -0.34*** 0.051 -0.36*** 0.046 
LLP i, t-1 -0.04 0.052 -0.06 0.047 -0.03 0.034 
LLP i, t-2 0.04 0.027 0.04 0.027 -0.03 0.029 
Total Assets 0.14 0.213 0.16 0.225 -0.28 0.193 
Equity_assets 0.04** 0.020 0.04** 0.020 0.01 0.019 
Loans_assets 0.00 0.004 0.00 0.005 -0.01 0.006 
Cost Income ratio -0.02*** 0.003 -0.02*** 0.003 -0.02*** 0.002 
GDP growth rate -0.01 0.013 -0.01 0.012 0.01 0.006 
HICP 0.01 0.018 0.01 0.018 0.01 0.014 
HHI 0.62 1.447 0.43 1.494 -3.36* 1.778 
D_sovereign_crisis -0.13*** 0.037 -0.13*** 0.038 -0.10*** 0.029 
Constant -1.19 4.034 -1.49 4.257   
No. of observations 505  505  505  
No. of banks 101  101  101  
R-squared 0.52  0.52    
AR(1)     0.000  
AR(2)     0.052  
Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 8. Reduced period (2008-2014): regression results for return on average equity 
Dep. var.: ROAE (1) FE_stat (2) FE_dyn (3) GMM 
Explanatory var. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. 
ROAE i, t-1   0.04 0.073 0.14*** 0.041 
ALG i, t 0.03 0.044 0.03 0.045 0.07 0.057 
ALG i, t-1 0.17*** 0.039 0.18*** 0.038 0.16*** 0.034 
ALG i, t-2 0.12*** 0.044 0.11** 0.043 0.08** 0.031 
LLP i, t -5.03*** 0.813 -4.99*** 0.866 -5.21*** 0.802 
LLP i, t-1 -0.51 0.878 -0.32 0.776 0.23 0.608 
LLP i, t-2 0.98* 0.507 0.99** 0.490 -0.08 0.519 
Total Assets 7.96* 4.311 7.59* 4.160 1.36 3.522 
Equity_assets 0.79** 0.364 0.79** 0.353 0.17 0.352 
Loans_assets -0.00 0.088 -0.01 0.084 -0.11 0.104 
Cost Income ratio -0.33*** 0.052 -0.33*** 0.052 -0.33*** 0.032 
GDP growth rate -0.19 0.204 -0.21 0.204 0.11 0.104 
HICP 0.43 0.286 0.40 0.279 0.20 0.243 
HHI -11.36 26.022 -9.27 26.303 -41.31 30.830 
D_sovereign_crisis -2.53*** 0.628 -2.49*** 0.604 -1.71*** 0.500 
Constant -115.05 81.394 -108.54 78.521   
No. of observations 505  505  505  
No. of banks 101  101  101  
R-squared 0.55  0.55    
AR(1)     0.000  
AR(2)     0.175  
Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
Secondly (see Tables 9 and 10), since French banks numerically dominate our panel, we run the three regressions 
excluding these latter intermediaries. Moreover, we test other sample selections excluding some borderline 
observations (e.g. banks with extremely low values in ROAE and Loans to total assets). Once more, our main 
results are unaffected. 
 
Table 9. Reduced sample (excluding French banks): regression results for Return on Average Assets 
Dep. var.: ROAA 1 FE_stat  2 FE_dyn  3 GMM 
Explanatory var. Coeff. St.Err.  Coeff. St.Err.  Coeff. St.Err. 
ROAA i, t-1    0.01 0.076  0.02 0.050 
ALG i, t 0.01** 0.003  0.01** 0.003  0.00 0.004 
ALG i, t-1 0.01*** 0.002  0.01*** 0.002  0.01*** 0.003 
ALG i, t-2 0.00 0.004  0.00 0.004  0.00 0.003 
LLP i, t -0.30*** 0.051  -0.30*** 0.052  -0.33*** 0.048 
LLP i, t-1 0.02 0.040  0.02 0.041  0.02 0.042 
LLP i, t-2 0.00 0.033  0.00 0.033  -0.01 0.038 
Total Assets -0.13 0.234  -0.13 0.230  -0.29 0.208 
Equity_assets 0.07*** 0.020  0.07*** 0.021  0.06** 0.025 
Loans_assets -0.00 0.006  -0.00 0.006  -0.00 0.007 
Cost Income ratio -0.02*** 0.003  -0.02*** 0.003  -0.02*** 0.002 
GDP growth rate 0.01 0.009  0.01 0.010  0.01 0.008 
HICP 0.05*** 0.019  0.05** 0.021  0.05** 0.019 
HHI -3.54** 1.569  -3.51** 1.741  -2.86 1.913 
D_sovereign_crisis -0.17*** 0.036  -0.17*** 0.041  -0.15*** 0.042 
Constant 3.72 4.389  3.69 4.324    
No. of observations 385   385   330  
No. of banks 55   55   55  
R-squared 0.55   0.55     
AR1       0.000  
AR2       0.705  
Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Table 10. Reduced sample (excluding French banks): regression results for return on average equity 
Dep. var.: ROAE 1 FE_stat  2 FE_dyn  3 GMM 
Explanatory var. Coeff. St.Err.  Coeff. St.Err.  Coeff. St.Err. 
ROAE i, t-1    0.14** 0.065  0.14*** 0.048 
ALG i, t 0.12* 0.067  0.10 0.065  0.04 0.064 
ALG i, t-1 0.16*** 0.047  0.14*** 0.041  0.12** 0.048 
ALG i, t-2 0.07 0.054  0.06 0.051  0.04 0.047 
LLP i, t -5.55*** 1.045  -5.41*** 1.073  -5.99*** 0.821 
LLP i, t-1 0.28 0.857  0.82 0.782  0.59 0.735 
LLP i, t-2 0.31 0.738  0.34 0.747  -0.11 0.657 
Total Assets -0.77 5.599  -0.90 4.859  -4.53 3.606 
Equity_assets 0.85 0.545  0.79* 0.459  0.54 0.436 
Loans_assets -0.08 0.143  -0.06 0.126  -0.10 0.119 
Cost Income ratio -0.39*** 0.054  -0.38*** 0.053  -0.40*** 0.035 
GDP growth rate 0.16 0.153  0.14 0.159  0.15 0.138 
HICP 0.65* 0.349  0.40 0.341  0.24 0.322 
HHI -61.90* 36.934  -48.37 32.296  -33.75 33.133 
D_sovereign_crisis -2.07** 0.781  -1.59** 0.605  -1.36* 0.713 
Constant 45.27 101.900  44.84 88.367    
No. of observations 385   385   330  
No. of banks 55   55   55  
R-squared 0.52   0.53     
AR1       0.000  
AR2       0.617  
Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
Thirdly, (see Tables 11 and 12), the use of ALG may produce some (apparent) contradictions; the most important 
is that we may obtain a positive ALG from a negative loan growth rate. During the crisis, widespread credit 
rationing was observed in the countries under examination. If a bank is reducing the amount of credit granted to 
the economy less than the banking sector (on average) in the same country, we obtain a positive ALG. It could be 
argued that this lower reduction, from a competitive point of view, can be seen as an expanding strategy; in any 
case, we re-estimate our model using only banks that experienced positive loan growth in the period under 
analysis. Results for ROAA still remain unchanged, while for ROAE we find a reduction in the significance of 
the coefficients; it must be noted that these robustness checks reduce the number of observations and this leads 
to several drawbacks in estimations. 
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Table 11. Reduced sample (only banks with positive loan growth): regression results for return on average assets 
Dep. var.: ROAA 1 FE_stat 2 FE_dyn 3 GMM 
Explanatory var. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. 
ROAA i, t-1   0.01 0.076 0.02 0.050 
ALG i, t 0.01** 0.003 0.01** 0.003 0.00 0.004 
ALG i, t-1 0.01*** 0.002 0.01*** 0.002 0.01*** 0.003 
ALG i, t-2 0.00 0.004 0.00 0.004 0.00 0.003 
LLP i, t -0.30*** 0.051 -0.30*** 0.052 -0.33*** 0.048 
LLP i, t-1 0.02 0.040 0.02 0.041 0.02 0.042 
LLP i, t-2 0.00 0.033 0.00 0.033 -0.01 0.038 
Total Assets -0.13 0.234 -0.13 0.230 -0.29 0.208 
Equity_assets 0.07*** 0.020 0.07*** 0.021 0.06** 0.025 
Loans_assets -0.00 0.006 -0.00 0.006 -0.00 0.007 
Cost Income ratio -0.02*** 0.003 -0.02*** 0.003 -0.02*** 0.002 
GDP growth rate 0.01 0.009 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.008 
HICP 0.05*** 0.019 0.05** 0.021 0.05** 0.019 
HHI -3.54** 1.569 -3.51** 1.741 -2.86 1.913 
D_sovereign_crisis -0.17*** 0.036 -0.17*** 0.041 -0.15*** 0.042 
Constant 3.72 4.389 3.69 4.324   
No. of observations 510 510 418  
No. of banks 101 101 100  
R-squared 0.55 0.55   
AR1   0.011  
AR2   0.915  
Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
Table 12. Reduced sample (only banks with positive loan growth): regression results for return on average equity 
Dep. var.: ROAE 1 FE_stat 2 FE_dyn 3 GMM 
Explanatory var. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. 
ROAE i, t-1   0.14** 0.065 0.14*** 0.048 
ALG i, t 0.12* 0.067 0.10 0.065 0.04 0.064 
ALG i, t-1 0.16*** 0.047 0.14*** 0.041 0.12** 0.048 
ALG i, t-2 0.07 0.054 0.06 0.051 0.04 0.047 
LLP i, t -5.55*** 1.045 -5.41*** 1.073 -5.99*** 0.821 
LLP i, t-1 0.28 0.857 0.82 0.782 0.59 0.735 
LLP i, t-2 0.31 0.738 0.34 0.747 -0.11 0.657 
Total Assets -0.77 5.599 -0.90 4.859 -4.53 3.606 
Equity_assets 0.85 0.545 0.79* 0.459 0.54 0.436 
Loans_assets -0.08 0.143 -0.06 0.126 -0.10 0.119 
Cost Income ratio -0.39*** 0.054 -0.38*** 0.053 -0.40*** 0.035 
GDP growth rate 0.16 0.153 0.14 0.159 0.15 0.138 
HICP 0.65* 0.349 0.40 0.341 0.24 0.322 
HHI -61.90* 36.934 -48.37 32.296 -33.75 33.133 
D_sovereign_crisis -2.07** 0.781 -1.59** 0.605 -1.36* 0.713 
Constant 45.27 101.900 44.84 88.367   
No. of observations 510  510  418  
No. of banks 101  101  100  
R-squared 0.52  0.53    
AR1     0.024  
AR2     0.862  
Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
4.1.3 Alternative Model Specification 
Our original econometric framework is designed to control explicitly for efficiency and credit quality through the 
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inclusion in the estimations of cost income ratio and loan loss provision figures. However, since operating costs 
and provisions for loan losses directly influence bank profitability in the Income Statement, we estimate the 
impact of ALG on ROAA and ROAE excluding cost income ratios and LLP. Moreover, we employ the natural 
logarithm of loans instead of total assets to control for bank size (Foos, Noorden and Weber, 2010); this latter 
choice was already introduced for the first robustness check previously described (table 6). Results are presented 
in Tables 13 to 20; our main findings are unaffected by this alternative specification. 
 
Table 13. Estimation results for Return on Average Assets (alternative model specification) 
Dep. var.: ROAA (1) FE_stat (2) FE_dyn  (3) GMM
Explanatory var. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err.  Coeff. St.Err.
ROAA i, t-1    0.11 0.094  0.12** 0.047
ALG i, t 0.01** 0.003  0.01* 0.004  0.01** 0.004
ALG i, t-1 0.01*** 0.003  0.01*** 0.003  0.01*** 0.002
ALG i, t-2 0.01* 0.003  0.01* 0.003  0.01*** 0.002
Size ln loans -0.01 0.277  -0.01 0.262  -0.31 0.211
Equity_assets 0.11*** 0.030  0.10*** 0.030  0.07*** 0.023
Loans_assets 0.00 0.006  0.00 0.005  0.01** 0.006
GDP growth rate 0.02** 0.008  0.02** 0.007  0.02*** 0.007
HICP 0.03 0.020  0.02 0.022  0.01 0.014
HHI -7.79*** 2.650  -6.82*** 2.523  -7.61*** 1.825
D_sovereign_crisis -0.17*** 0.041  -0.15*** 0.042  -0.12*** 0.034
Constant 0.01 5.906  0.10 5.565   
No. of Observations 707   707   606  
No. of banks 101   101   101  
R-squared 0.22   0.23     
AR(1)       0.000  
AR(2)       0.010  
Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
Table 14. Estimation results for Return on Average Equity (alternative model specification) 
Dep. var.: ROAE (1) FE_stat (2) FE_dyn (3) GMM
Explanatory var. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err.
ROAE i, t-1   0.22*** 0.075 0.23*** 0.046
ALG i, t 0.12* 0.073 0.09 0.067 0.15** 0.075
ALG i, t-1 0.15*** 0.056 0.13*** 0.046 0.15*** 0.042
ALG i, t-2 0.13** 0.058 0.12** 0.053 0.14*** 0.039
Size ln loans 2.08 6.061 1.03 5.191 -2.90 3.874
Equity_assets 1.63** 0.649 1.45** 0.567 0.96** 0.432
Loans_assets -0.04 0.147 -0.03 0.124 0.16 0.112
GDP growth rate 0.31** 0.142 0.30** 0.133 0.34*** 0.127
HICP 0.35 0.346 -0.07 0.332 -0.15 0.255
HHI -128.53** 55.763 -99.74** 43.432 -107.50*** 33.260
D_sovereign_crisis -2.84*** 0.838 -2.16*** 0.679 -1.58** 0.619
Constant -42.68 127.523 -21.92 109.115   
No. of Observations 707  707  606  
No. of banks 101  101  101  
R-squared 0.16  0.21    
AR(1)     0.000  
AR(2)     0.006  
Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Table 15. Reduced period (2008-2014): regression results for return on average assets (alternative model 
specification) 
Dep. var.: ROAA (1) FE_stat (2) FE_dyn  (3) GMM
Explanatory var. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err.  Coeff. St.Err.
ROAA i, t-1    -0.05 0.106  0.06 0.048
ALG i, t 0.00 0.004  0.00 0.004  0.00 0.005
ALG i, t-1 0.01*** 0.004  0.01*** 0.004  0.01*** 0.002
ALG i, t-2 0.01*** 0.004  0.01*** 0.004  0.01*** 0.002
Size ln loans 0.55 0.342  0.58 0.351  0.15 0.224
Equity_assets 0.11*** 0.031  0.11*** 0.033  0.06*** 0.023
Loans_assets -0.00 0.005  -0.00 0.005  0.01 0.007
GDP growth rate 0.01 0.012  0.01 0.012  0.01** 0.007
HICP 0.04 0.029  0.04 0.029  0.01 0.017
HHI -3.01* 1.755  -3.20* 1.867  -6.20*** 2.191
D_sovereign_crisis -0.16*** 0.041  -0.16*** 0.043  -0.15*** 0.035
Constant -11.91 7.358  -12.45 7.539    
No. of Observations 505   505   505  
No. of banks 101   101   101  
R-squared 0.23   0.23     
AR(1)       0.000  
AR(2)       0.083  
Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
Table 16. Reduced period (2008-2014): regression results for Return on Average Equity (alternative model 
specification) 
Dep. var.: ROAE (1) FE_stat (2) FE_dyn (3) GMM 
Explanatory var. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. 
ROAE i, t-1   0.06 0.095 0.21*** 0.045 
ALG i, t 0.01 0.061 0.01 0.061 0.05 0.080 
ALG i, t-1 0.20*** 0.068 0.20*** 0.065 0.22*** 0.043 
ALG i, t-2 0.17** 0.071 0.16** 0.071 0.15*** 0.038 
Size ln loans 15.29** 6.001 14.62** 5.812 7.34* 3.991 
Equity_assets 1.81*** 0.582 1.77*** 0.587 0.81* 0.419 
Loans_assets -0.20* 0.106 -0.20** 0.100 -0.02 0.114 
GDP growth rate 0.24 0.192 0.22 0.198 0.21* 0.123 
HICP 0.84* 0.456 0.76* 0.443 0.24 0.298 
HHI -70.55** 33.355 -66.73* 34.894 -92.01** 38.494 
D_sovereign_crisis -3.18*** 0.677 -3.12*** 0.662 -2.78*** 0.615 
Constant -318.63** 129.200 -304.48** 125.066   
No. of Observations 505  505  505  
No. of banks 101  101  101  
R-squared 0.26  0.26    
AR(1)     0.000  
AR(2)     0.018  
Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Table 17. Reduced sample (excluding French banks): regression results for Return on Average Assets (alternative 
model specification) 
Dep. var.: ROAA (1) FE_stat (2) FE_dyn  (3) GMM
Explanatory var. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err.  Coeff. St.Err.
ROAA i, t-1    0.05 0.108  0.08 0.058
ALG i, t 0.01** 0.004  0.01** 0.005  0.01 0.005
ALG i, t-1 0.01*** 0.003  0.01*** 0.004  0.01*** 0.003
ALG i, t-2 0.01* 0.005  0.01* 0.005  0.01** 0.003
Size (ln loans -0.06 0.391  -0.06 0.383  -0.15 0.267
Equity_assets 0.14*** 0.034  0.14*** 0.035  0.11*** 0.030
Loans_assets -0.00 0.009  -0.00 0.009  0.01 0.008
GDP growth rate 0.02* 0.009  0.02* 0.009  0.02 0.010
HICP 0.06* 0.028  0.05 0.030  0.04* 0.022
HHI -6.95** 2.735  -6.53** 2.794  -5.49** 2.409
D_sovereign_crisis -0.25*** 0.056  -0.23*** 0.060  -0.21*** 0.053
Constant 1.12 8.379  1.12 8.191    
No. of Observations 385   385   330  
No. of banks 55   55   55  
R-squared 0.28   0.28     
AR(1)       0.000  
AR(2)       0.189  
Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
Table 18. Reduced sample (excluding French banks): regression results for Return on Average Equity 
(alternative model specification) 
Dep. var.: ROAE (1) FE_stat (2) FE_dyn (3) GMM
Explanatory var. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err.
ROAE i, t-1   0.20** 0.090 0.24*** 0.058
ALG i, t 0.19* 0.097 0.15 0.092 0.14 0.088
ALG i, t-1 0.21*** 0.070 0.18*** 0.060 0.20*** 0.061
ALG i, t-2 0.19** 0.086 0.16** 0.080 0.16*** 0.060
Size ln loans -0.52 8.008 -1.02 7.065 -4.12 4.791
Equity_assets 2.28*** 0.778 2.07*** 0.711 1.61*** 0.548
Loans_assets -0.15 0.227 -0.14 0.195 0.04 0.143
GDP growth rate 0.33* 0.166 0.31* 0.159 0.30* 0.172
HICP 0.69 0.455 0.19 0.457 0.04 0.394
HHI -123.84** 57.235 -98.45** 46.603 -82.33* 43.125
D_sovereign_crisis -3.52*** 1.184 -2.76*** 0.964 -2.21** 0.928
Constant 12.25 169.769 22.24 149.721   
No. of Observations 385  385  330  
No. of banks 55  55  55  
R-squared 0.21  0.25    
AR(1)     0.000  
AR(2)     0.117  
Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Table 19. Reduced sample (only banks with positive loan growth): regression results for Return on Average 
Assets (alternative model specification) 
Dep. var.: ROAA (1) FE_stat (2) FE_dyn  (3) GMM
Explanatory var. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err.  Coeff. St.Err.
ROAA i, t-1    0.23*** 0.079  -0.23*** 0.042
ALG i, t 0.01 0.004  0.00 0.003  0.01* 0.003
ALG i, t-1 0.00 0.003  0.00 0.003  0.00** 0.002
ALG i, t-2 0.01 0.003  0.00 0.003  0.00* 0.002
Size ln loans -0.48 0.309  -0.46 0.280  -0.91*** 0.241
Equity_assets 0.06*** 0.022  0.04** 0.017  -0.04* 0.020
Loans_assets 0.01 0.005  0.01 0.005  0.01** 0.004
GDP growth rate 0.02** 0.009  0.02** 0.008  0.01** 0.006
HICP 0.00 0.020  -0.02 0.020  -0.01 0.014
HHI -6.68** 2.641  -5.08** 2.345  -2.95* 1.657
D_sovereign_crisis -0.07 0.046  -0.02 0.039  0.04 0.043
Constant 9.98 6.446  9.44 5.822    
No. of Observations 510   510   418  
No. of banks 101   101   100  
R-squared 0.22   0.27     
AR(1)       0.859  
AR(2)       0.613  
Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
Table 20. Reduced sample (only banks with positive loan growth): regression results for Return on Average 
Equity (alternative model specification) 
Dep. var.: ROAE (1) FE_stat (2) FE_dyn (3) GMM
Explanatory var. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err.
ROAE i, t-1   0.31*** 0.113 -0.07 0.051
ALG i, t 0.10 0.081 0.07 0.069 0.07 0.058
ALG i, t-1 0.10 0.067 0.06 0.051 0.06 0.041
ALG i, t-2 0.11* 0.066 0.09 0.056 0.05 0.036
Size ln loans -4.46 7.256 -5.49 5.905 -8.07* 4.832
Equity_assets 0.92 0.675 0.50 0.466 -0.75* 0.406
Loans_assets -0.00 0.135 0.04 0.117 -0.11 0.089
GDP growth rate 0.36** 0.177 0.33** 0.164 0.27** 0.117
HICP -0.06 0.393 -0.54 0.345 -0.46* 0.276
HHI -110.53* 57.158 -75.26 45.950 -48.18 32.903
D_sovereign_crisis -1.40 1.154 -0.34 0.872 0.45 0.867
Constant 98.27 151.366 117.84 122.464   
No. of Observations 510  510  418  
No. of banks 101  101  100  
R-squared 0.12  0.20    
AR(1)     0.937  
AR(2)     0.951  
Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
In recent years, lending policies come to the forefront of academic and political debate, due to the primary role 
that credit expansion played in the crisis. Our results show that expansive credit strategies can improve bank 
profitability when combined with wise provisioning and stable quality in lending standards. The hypothesis 
concerning the role of the crisis in reducing agency problems and moral hazard issues finds support in the 
empirical results previously shown and discussed. This outcome seems in contrast with a widespread view in the 
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literature concerning the negative relationship between loan growth and bank profitability, given the tendency of 
the banking system to relax lending access rules and underestimate loan impairment charges during sound 
periods. However, our empirical results tend to complement this same literature; it emerges that the main issue is 
not credit growth per se, but the perverse combination of high credit growth, low provisioning and looser lending 
standards. 
These outcomes have relevant policy implications. Firstly, we demonstrate that ALG can be consistent with an 
increment in bank profitability; the “curse of the winner” is an outcome caused by underestimation of risks 
together with managerial myopia, which can be eliminated through wise provisioning and credit risk assessment. 
From a regulatory point of view, our results indicate that the correct balance between growth and provisioning 
should be the key element to be monitored; this also has implications for the ongoing debate on the revision of 
internal rating based models. Moreover, the ability to gain market share in the credit market during a crisis 
signals a bank’s health and hence is to be considered a positive element when evaluating it from the perspective 
of profit generation. 
Overall, the recent crisis has played a dual role in the years that have followed. Undoubtedly, it has led to a 
dramatic fall in bank profitability, leading to a severe economic downturn. However, from a different perspective, 
it has also underlined the importance of the traditional drivers of bank management after a period dominated by 
more speculative business strategies. In this sense, a return to the basics of bank management – improving 
efficiency, credit policies and finding a sound competitive positioning – will be fundamental to generating proper 
profitability compatible with meeting capital requirements and being attractive on capital markets. 
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